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enforcement of IEAs is associated with higher international environmental quality. Moreover, 
under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly enforcement. 
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Enforcing ‘Self-Enforcing’ International Environmental Agreements 
 
 
Abstract: Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically 
employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an 
agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the 
stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place.   
Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance by parties to the terms of 
an agreement. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an 
independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties’ compliance to the terms of 
the IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent 
with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh Accords. We find 
that costly enforcement limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect 
the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will involve greater participation 
than IEAs that do not require costly enforcement. Consequently, costly enforcement of IEAs is 
associated with higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, 
aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly enforcement. These conclusions are 
accentuated when monitoring for compliance to IEAs is inaccurate. 
 
 








International environmental agreements (IEAs) made between sovereign nations seeking to 
manage shared environmental and natural resources are susceptible to two sources of free-riding.  
First, because participation to IEAs are voluntary, countries can decide at will whether to become 
a party to an agreement.  If an IEA only requires a subset of countries to join before entering into 
force, as is typically the case, then incentives exist for some countries to stay out of the 
agreement and free-ride off the provision of the cooperating others.  Second, if compliance with 
the terms of the agreement are not enforced well, parties to an IEA will have an incentive to 
violate the terms of the agreement and free-ride off those countries that do comply. Previous 
theoretical analyses of IEAs have usually investigated the impact the first form of free-riding has 
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on the effectiveness of IEAs, while avoiding altogether the possibility that member countries 
may not fully comply with their commitments.  In this paper, we deal directly with the issue of 
noncompliance within IEAs by constructing and analyzing a game in which parties to an IEA 
finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor parties’ compliance 
behavior and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. 
There is ample evidence that many existing IEAs experience significant problems with 
noncompliance.  For example, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) has witnessed hundreds of infractions every year since its inception in 1979 (Swanson 
and Johnston 1999; Finus 2004).  Similarly, customs officers throughout the world frequently 
intercept flows of CFC products even though these substances have been banned under the 
Montreal Protocol since 1991 (Finus 2004). As a more recent example, although the performance 
of the Kyoto Protocol cannot formally be evaluated until the end of the first commitment period 
(2008-2012), many countries are currently on pace to significantly exceed their quotas (Friends 
of the Earth 2006).
1
  Not surprisingly, many IEAs include provisions for enforcement. The critical element of 
these enforcement mechanisms is that they must be negotiated and included as part of the 
agreement.  In addition, as Hovi and Areklett (2004, pg 3) point out, “… enforcement must either 
be carried out by the parties themselves, or by some institution erected, accepted and empowered 
by the parties.”   An example of the first approach is contained in the Montreal Protocol, which 
enforces compliance by threatening the use of trade sanctions on defecting parties (Benedick 
                                                 
1 Although it is universally accepted that some level of noncompliance with IEAs exists, there remains debate as to 
the magnitude and consequences of noncompliance.  On one end of the debate, Chayes and Chayes (1991) argue 
that high levels of compliance are often observed in IEAs without formal enforcement mechanisms and therefore 
enforcement is not a real concern.  On the other end, Downs et al. (1996) argue that high levels of compliance may 
result because the lack of enforcement motivates parties to form shallow agreements to begin with. 
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1998; Heister 1997).  It is one of an estimated 19 IEAs that uses trade sanctions as a mechanism 
for motivating compliance (United States International Trade Commission 1991).
2   
  An example of an “institution erected, accepted and empowered by the parties” to enforce 
compliance with an IEA has been implemented within the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh 
Accords. An independent Compliance Committee, consisting of members elected by the parties, 
has been formed to oversee monitoring for compliance and applying sanctions in cases of 
noncompliance. If a party to the Kyoto Protocol is found in violation, the Compliance Committee 
has the power to impose a penalty in the form of a reduction in next period’s greenhouse gas 
emissions quota (UNFCC 2002). Although it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this type 
of enforcement mechanism, its structure is unique in the sense that parties have agreed to invest 
in an institution with the power to monitor and sanction noncompliance.   
Conceptually, IEAs have often been modeled with the equilibrium concept of a self-
enforcing agreement.  A self-enforcing agreement made between agents, as first proposed by 
D’Aspremont et al. (1983) and later coined by Barrett (1994) for use in his analysis of 
international environmental relations, is defined as a single coalition from which no member 
wishes to withdraw (the coalition is internally stable) and no nonmember wishes to join (the 
coalition is externally stable).
 3  The term self-enforcing is a bit misleading, however, because it 
does not address the problem of enforcing compliance by parties to a cooperative agreement. In 
fact, most authors who use this equilibrium concept simply assume that parties to a self-
enforcing agreement comply fully with the terms of the agreement (e.g. Barrett 1994, 2003; 
                                                 
2 Barrett (2003) estimates that a much larger number of IEAs make provisions for trade sanctions, however, many of 
those agreements use bans on traded items as part of the agreement’s goal, not its method of enforcement.   
3 Models of self-enforcing IEAs have included provisions for trade sanctions (Barrett 1997a; 1997b), side payments 
(Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Carraro and Botteon 1997 and Hoel and Schneider 1997), issue linkage (Folmer 1993; 
Carraro and Siniscalco 1997; Botteon and Carraro 1998) and minimum participation requirements (Barrett 1998a; 
2003 and Carraro et al. 2003).  For a review of many of these extensions see Wagner (2001). 
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Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1998; Hoel 1992).  A few studies do include costly enforcement 
mechanisms within the framework of a repeated IEA (Barrett 1994, 2003; Finus and Rundshagen 
1998). These models use reciprocal punishment strategies in which parties to an agreement may 
punish violators in future rounds by jointly reducing the level of the international public good.  
  We take a different approach to the study of compliance and enforcement of IEAs that is 
motivated by the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh Accords. 
We maintain the concept of a self-enforcing agreement to determine the equilibrium number of 
parties to an IEA. However, to counteract the incentive that parties have to violate the terms of 
an IEA, they finance and empower an independent enforcement agency with monitoring and 
sanctioning capabilities.  
  Our efforts yield a number of new results.  First, the range of international environmental 
problems within which a self-enforcing IEA can form is smaller when enforcing cooperation is 
necessary and costly. This follows because enforcement increases the cost of cooperation, which 
in turn limits the set of situations under which a treaty can actually increase international welfare. 
Second, when an IEA is expected to form, it will have more members when enforcement is 
costly, hence, costly enforcement of IEAs is associated with higher environmental quality.  
Greater participation in IEAs that are costly to enforce occurs because the additional cost of 
being a party to an IEA must be offset with an increase in the level of environmental quality, 
which is realized through an increase in the number of parties to the agreement.  In addition, 
provided that the number of countries involved is sufficiently large, social welfare will be greater 
under an IEA that is costly to enforce.  If the number of countries involved is large enough, the 
aggregate benefit from increased participation levels the parties’ costs of enforcing their 
agreement.  Finally, we find that when monitoring for compliance is not perfectly accurate, the 
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principal results of our model are accentuated.  That is, monitoring errors further reduce the set 
of situations in which multilateral cooperation is welfare enhancing and thus limit the 
opportunities for an IEA to form.  However, when an agreement does form it will involve a 
higher level of participation.    
  The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model of a self-enforcing 
IEA without enforcement costs. In section 3 we introduce the endogenous enforcement 
mechanism, and in section 4 draw conclusions about the effects of costly enforcement on the 
equilibrium number of parties to an agreement and on aggregate welfare. In section 5 we extend 
the model to allow for errors in monitoring. In section 6 we provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The basic model of a self-enforcing IEA 
In this section we present a standard model of a self-enforcing IEA in order to review the 
structure of these games and to provide a baseline for determining the effects of costly 
enforcement on the outcomes of these games in later sections. Following Barrett (2003), consider 
a situation where N identical countries each emit a uniformly mixed transboundary pollutant. 
Country i’s welfare is   
() ii i wA b qq c q − =+ + −i ,         [ 1 ]    
where  is equal to one of i abates its emissions and is zero if it does not,   is the sum of the 
abatement decision by all other countries, b is the constant marginal benefit of abatement, c is the 
cost of abatement, and A is a positive constant. Assume that the underlying structure of the 
countries’ interactions with each other is an N-player prisoners’ dilemma. That is, all countries 
have a dominant strategy to not abate in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. This will be true 
i q i q−
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when  .  However, the countries’ joint welfare will be maximized when they all abate their 
emissions. This requires  . 
bc <
Nb c >
  Recognizing the benefits from jointly agreeing to abate their emissions, the countries 
have the incentive to form an international environmental agreement to do so. Because 
participation in an IEA is voluntary, countries can join or not join the agreement at will.  In this 
section, however, parties to any IEA that forms will comply with the terms of the agreement, that 
is they will abate their emissions, without the need for an enforcement mechanism.  
Let s denote the number of parties to an IEA. Moreover, let  denote the common 
welfare of each of the parties to the IEA, and let   denote the common welfare of each of 
the countries that are not party to the agreement. Throughout, the superscript p signals that the 
country in question is a party to an IEA, while the superscript np signals that the country is not a 






p ws Ab sc =+− ; 
()
np ws A b s =+ .        [ 2 ]  
Let s
nc denote the equilibrium number of parties to an IEA. (The superscript nc identifies s
nc as 
the equilibrium number of parties when the terms of an IEA are not costly to enforce). The 
definition of a self-enforcing voluntary agreement in this setting is:  
  
Definition: An IEA consisting of s
nc countries that can enforce the IEA without cost is self-
enforcing if and only if:  
(i)    ( ) ( 1)
pn c n pn c ws w s ≥−
(ii)  . ( ) ( 1)
np nc p nc ws w s ≥+
4      [ 3 ]  
                                                 
4 Although the concept of a self-enforcing agreement is most often adopted for analyses of international 
environmental agreements, it was first developed to study the stability of cartels by D’Apremont et al. (1983).  See 
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    Requirement (i) of a self-enforcing IEA is that no party has an incentive to leave the 
agreement; that is, the agreement is internally stable. Requirement (ii) is that no non-party 
wishes to join the IEA; that is, the agreement is externally stable.  The equilibrium value of s
nc 
follows easily from these two conditions.  
Using the welfare functions [2] and the external stability condition (ii), 
 Since we have assumed that  () ( 1 ) 0 .
np p wsw s c b −+ = − ≥ bc < , the external stability condition 
is always satisfied. Determining the values of s that satisfy the internal stability condition (i) 
involves examining the consequences of two possible outcomes of a single country that leaves an 
IEA. The first is when this single defection does not cause all the other parties to the IEA to also 
defect. In this case, using [2] and the internal stability condition (i),   
which violates our assumption that b
( ) ( 1) 0,
pn p ws w s bc −− = − ≥
c < .  This implies that if the number of parties to an IEA is 
such that it would remain intact if one party defected, then the IEA is not internally stable. Thus, 
the self-enforcing number of parties to an agreement must be such that one defection would 
make the agreement collapse. In this case, the internal stability condition (i) is written as 
 The self-enforcing number of parties to an agreement that is 
enforced without cost is the minimum size coalition that satisfies this inequality. Formally: 
() ( 0 ) 0 .
pn p ws w b sc −= − ≥
m i n| ( ) ( 0 ) 0 m i n| /.
nc p np ss w s w s s c =− ≥ =b ≥
                                                                                                                                                            
    [4] 
Our assumption that b  implies that  , while the assumption that   implies that 
[4] will be satisfied for some   Condition [4] indicates that participation with an IEA is 
increasing in the cost of abatement, c, and decreasing in the individual benefit of abatement, b. 
c < 1




Diamontoudi (2005) for a recent contribution to this literature. Dawson and Segerson (2003) have used the concept 
of a self-enforcing agreement to model voluntary domestic environmental policies.   
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Thus, Barrett’s (1994, 2003) claim that international cooperation to protect the environment will 
be greatest when it is needed least is easily verified.  
It is clear that the concept of a self-enforcing agreement applies to the stability of a 
cooperating coalition, not to parties’ decisions to comply with the terms of the agreement once 
they’ve joined. However, Barrett (1998b, pg 36) claims: “The binding constraint on international 
cooperation is free-rider deterrence, not compliance enforcement.  Once free-riding 
[nonparticipation] can be deterred, compliance can be enforced free of charge.” This is a very 
strong statement that follows if countries are able to observe each other’s compliance decisions 
perfectly and without cost. In this setting a country has no incentive to join an agreement and 
then not comply with its requirements. If it did so all the other participating nations would 
automatically observe this violation, would realize that they would then be worse off if they 
stayed with the agreement, and therefore would leave the agreement. Under perfect information a 
party to an IEA would not violate the terms of the agreement, because this violation would cause 
the agreement to collapse.  
Realistically, however, nations cannot observe each other’s abatement perfectly and 
without cost, nor can a country's abatement decision be inferred from an aggregate measure (e.g., 
the global concentration of a pollutant). In these cases, a country may be motivated to join an 
agreement and then decide to violate its terms. If the other participating countries are not able to 
observe this act of noncompliance, they will not automatically leave the agreement. The violator, 
then, is able to escape the cost of compliance while enjoying the benefit of cooperation of those 
that remain with the agreement. Asymmetric information among parties to an IEA about their 
compliance decisions motivates the implementation of some enforcement mechanism to 
counteract the incentive to violate the terms of the agreement.  
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3.  Endogenous enforcement of compliance to an IEA 
We now give parties to an IEA the opportunity to violate the terms of the agreement, as well as 
the opportunity to invest in a third-party enforcement body that is charged with maintaining 
compliance to the agreement.  The enforcement mechanism works as follows; each party to the 
agreement pays x dollars to a third-party enforcement body that is capable of monitoring the 
parties with probability π  and penalizing noncompliant parties with a fine f.  
  The monitoring capability of the enforcer is a montonically increasing function of the 
amount of funding provided by the parties. Suppose that monitoring consists of random audits of 
the parties. Audits are perfectly accurate in the sense that an audit always uncovers a violation if 
one has occurred and does not ‘discover’ a violation when one hasn’t occurred. (We examine the 
consequences of inaccurate monitoring in section 5). Each dollar of additional enforcement 
funding allows the number of random audits to increase by α ; that is, α  is the constant 
marginal productivity of resources devoted to monitoring. If s parties to an agreement each 
provide x to fund the enforcer, then the number of random audits the enforcer conducts is sxα , 
and the probability that any party is audited is  
   / sx s x π α == α .        [ 5 ]  
Clearly, constraining π  to be between zero and one requires  [0, 1/ ] x α ∈ . We will maintain this 
assumption throughout. The expected penalty for noncompliance is  f xf π α = . The fine, f, is 
constrained (by convention, norm, or law) to be no more than  f .  
Assume that the parties to an IEA are risk neutral, and that they comply with the terms of 
the agreement if they are at least indifferent between compliance and noncompliance. Then, 
given an agreement consisting of s parties, an individual party will comply if its payoff from 
doing so is not less than its expected payoff from noncompliance. A party’s payoff from 
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compliance is  , and its expected payoff from noncompliance is  ( )
p ws x − ( 1)
np ws xx f α −−− , 
where recall that   and   are defined by  [2]. Therefore, a party to an IEA complies 
with the terms of the agreement if and only if [
( )
p ws ( 1)
np ws −
( ) ] [ ( 1) ]
pn p ws x w s xxf α − −− − − =
0
 
() xf cb α −−≥ .  Intuitively, if the expected penalty,  x f α , is less than the gain from 
noncompliance, c , then all parties to an IEA will violate its terms and no self-enforcing 
agreement is possible. On the other hand, if 
b −
x f α is no less than cb − , each party to an IEA will 
comply with its requirements. Clearly,  ( ) 0 xf cb α − −≥  is a necessary condition for a viable 
IEA. Indeed, a self-enforcing IEA that is costly to enforce is not internally stable unless this 
condition holds.  
Now let us determine each party’s contribution to the enforcer of an IEA. Clearly, each 
would like to contribute as little as possible while providing the enforcer with sufficient 
resources to maintain compliance with the agreement. This requires a payment x so that 
() xf cb 0 α −−≥  binds, yielding  ( )/ . x cb f α =−  Moreover, since x is monotonically decreasing 
in the fine for noncompliance, the parties to the agreement will choose the fine to be as high as 
possible; that is,  f f = .
5  Thus, the contribution to the enforcer of an IEA that is required of all 
parties to the agreement is  
() / . x cb f α =−        [ 6 ]    
Note that this payment decreases with the maximal fine, f , and the marginal productivity of 
resources devoted to monitoring, α , but is increasing in the gain from noncompliance,  . cb −  
 
                                                 
5 The idea that the penalty for noncompliance should be set as high as possible to conserve on monitoring costs 
when agents are risk neutral is common in the literature on the economics of law enforcement. See Polinsky and 
Shavell (2000) for a review of this literature. 
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4.  Self-enforcing IEAs with costly enforcement 
We are now ready to analyze the consequences of costly enforcement of international 
environmental agreements. The first effect of costly enforcement is that it changes the set of 
circumstances under which cooperation increases aggregate welfare. Given s parties to an 
agreement that each earn    ( )
p ws x − Ab scx = +− − , and  Ns −  free-riding countries that each 
earn  , aggregate welfare when cooperation is costly to enforce is   ( )
np ws A b s =+
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() .
c Ws s Ab scx NsAb s
NA s Nb c x
=+ − − + − +
=+ − −
     [7] 
 (The superscript ‘c’ identifies variables and functions when cooperation is costly to enforce). 
Note that   is linearly decreasing in s if  ( )
c Ws 0 Nb c x − −<, and linearly increasing if 





>+ .          [ 8 ]  
If [8] holds, then any coalition of countries that cooperate to abate their emissions will 
increase aggregate welfare. Moreover, aggregate welfare is maximized if all countries cooperate 
to abate their emissions. If the inequality in [8] is reversed, then the costs of enforcing a 
cooperative agreement are high enough to make cooperation by any subset of countries 
inefficient. Recall that we assumed   under costless enforcement of an agreement so that 
any coalition of cooperating countries would increase aggregate welfare, and the grand coalition 
of cooperating countries maximized their joint welfare. Since  , the second term on the right 
side of [8] is strictly positive, which yields the following proposition:  
/ Nc b >
cb >
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Proposition 1: The set of values of N, b, and c for which international environmental agreements 
increase aggregate welfare is smaller when enforcement of these agreements is costly.  
 
  Since enforcing cooperation entails an additional cost of forming cooperative agreements, 
the set of circumstances under which cooperation will increase aggregate welfare is smaller than 
when cooperation can be enforced without cost.  It is straightforward to show that 
() cb c b b f α +− is increasing in c and decreasing in b. Thus, the set of circumstances under 
which cooperation is worthwhile is larger when abatement costs lower and the benefits of 
abatement are higher. Moreover,  () cb c b b f α +−  is decreasing in α  and  f .  Increasing either 
of these parameters decreases the payment cooperators pay to enforce an agreement, leading to 
an enlargement of the set of opportunities for welfare-enhancing cooperation.  
  Now let us determine the equilibrium coalition size when IEAs are costly to enforce. As 
in the case of costless enforcement, a self-enforcing equilibrium is the minimum size coalition of 
cooperating countries for which the welfare of each of these countries is not less than when no 
country abates their pollution. That is, letting s
c denote the size of a self-enforcing IEA with 
costly enforcement,   Using the welfare functions [2] and 
substituting for x from [6], the equilibrium size coalition under costly enforcement is: 
min | ( ) (0).
cp n ss w s x w =− ≥
p





=≥ +       [ 9 ]  
  An IEA with costly enforcement will form if and only if  () Nc bc b b f α ≥+ − , because 
then there exists a coalition   that satisfies [9]. On the other hand, when enforcement is 
costless the term 
c sN ≤
() cbbf α −  disappears, so that an IEA without costly enforcement will form 
as long as  Nc b ≥ .  Since () cbbf α − 0 > , we have the following proposition: 
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Proposition 2: If compliance to IEAs is costly to enforce, then the set of values of N, b, and c for 
which an IEA will form is smaller than when enforcement is costless.  
 
The condition under which an IEA with costly enforcement would be expected to form is 
identical to the condition that determines whether cooperative management of the international 
environmental resource will increase aggregate welfare (equation [8]). This is a simple statement 
that implies that a cooperative agreement among some subset of countries can be expected to 
form when cooperation among nations is worthwhile. Propositions 1 and 2 reveal that the 
circumstances under which cooperative agreements are expected emerge are limited by the need 
for costly enforcement.  
However, when an IEA is expected to form, costly enforcement implies that the number 
of parties to the agreement will typically be higher. When an IEA with costly enforcement forms, 
[9] indicates that the equilibrium size of the coalition s
c is the least s for which 
() sc b cb bf α ≥+ − . When an IEA is not costly to enforce, [4] indicates that the equilibrium 
coalition s
nc is the least s for which sc b ≥ . Again, since () 0 cbbf α − >
cn c ss ≥ ,  . Therefore:   
 
Proposition 3: If an IEA that is costly to enforce forms, membership in the IEA will be no less, 
and will typically be greater, than if the IEA could be enforced without cost.  
 
  The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Since contributing to enforcement is an 
additional cost of joining an IEA, more countries are required to participate in an IEA to make 
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the agreement worthwhile. Note that if an IEA forms, then costly enforcement is associated with 
increased environmental quality because more countries agree to abate their emissions.  
  Generally speaking, participation in an IEA increases with the costs of participation and 
decreases with the benefit that participation provides to all the countries. Thus, participation with 
an IEA that is costly to enforce increases with a country’s abatement cost, c, and decreases with 
individual benefit of some country’s abatement, b. Moreover, participation decreases as the cost 
of enforcement is reduced because either the marginal productivity of monitoring resources, α , 
increases or the maximal penalty for noncompliance,  f , increases.  
Finally, let us examine possible difference in aggregate welfare under self-enforcing 
IEAs that are costly to enforce and under those that are not costly to enforce. From [7] and [9], 
social welfare when a self-enforcing IEA requires costly enforcement is   




c NA s Nb c x +− − )
()
c sc bc b b f . α =+ −  Substitute this and  () x cb f α =−  from [6] into   to obtain  ( )
cc Ws
   ()
cc cc b c b
Ws N A N bc
bbf f αα
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ − −





.      [ 1 0 ]  
Welfare when a self-enforcing IEA does not require costly enforcement is   




nc NA s Nb c +−
nc sc = b  from [4] becomes 
   () ( ) ()
nc nc Ws N Ac b N b c =+ − .       [ 1 1 ]  




c c nc nc cb c cb
Ws W s N
f bb f αα
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Since the first term of   is positive, its sign is equal to the sign of the term in 
hard brackets. Therefore, we have our final proposition.  
( ) ( )
c c nc nc Ws W s −
 






>+ .         [ 1 2 ]  
 
Figure 1 illustrates how   vary with the number of potential parties to 
an IEA. To draw this graph we have assumed, without loss of generality, that A = 0.  Aggregate 
welfare when an IEA does not require costly enforcement, , is zero for  .  For 
,   increases linearly at rate c (from equation [11]). The size of a self-enforcing 
IEA does not change as N increases—it remains constant at c/b—but aggregate welfare increases 
with N because increasing N means we are increasing only the number of free-riding countries, 
each of which benefits from the abatement efforts of the c/b parties to the agreement.  
( ) and  ( )
c c nc nc Ws W s
( )
nc nc Ws / Nc b ≤
/ Nc b > ( )
nc nc Ws
The bold dashed function in Figure 1 is aggregate welfare for a self-enforcing IEA that is 
costly to enforce. Note that   is equal to zero for a larger range of N than  ; that is, 
up to 
( )
cc Ws ( )
nc nc Ws
() cb c b b f α +− .  This follows because cooperative abatement efforts that are costly to 
enforce increase aggregate welfare under a smaller set of circumstances than when cooperation 
can be enforced without cost (Proposition 1), and consequently, IEAs will only form under this 
smaller set of circumstances (Proposition 2). When  () Nc bc b b f α ≥+ − , the coalition 
()
c sc bc b b f α =+ −  forms and aggregate welfare increases with N at rate s
c
 (from equation 
[10]). It is important to reiterate, however, that the increase in aggregate welfare that comes from 
increasing N  goes entirely to the free-riding countries, and not to the members of s
c. 
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For () Nc bc b b f α >+ − , the relationship between   depends on 
two countervailing factors, the positive welfare effect of higher abatement when an IEA must be 
enforced (because   from Proposition 3) and the negative welfare effect of the costs of 
this enforcement.  For 
( ) and  ( )




) () , 2 () N c bc b b fc bc b b f α α ⎡ ∈+ − + − ⎣ , the enforcement-cost effect 
dominates the higher-abatement effect so that aggregate welfare is lower when the equilibrium 
IEA requires costly enforcement. However, when N exceeds 2( ) cb c b b f α +−  the higher-
abatement effect dominates the enforcement-cost effect so that aggregate welfare is higher when 
compliance to an agreement requires costly enforcement than when compliance can be enforced 
without cost. 
 

































Figure 1: Aggregate welfare from self-enforcing international environmental agreements 
when they are costly to enforce and when they are not costly to enforce.  
 
 
  16 
5.  Inaccurate monitoring 
We have assumed to this point that the third-party enforcer of an IEA is capable of monitoring 
member countries’ actions with complete accuracy.  That is, an audit always reveals a country’s 
true compliance status. However, monitoring of countries’ compliance behavior is likely to be 
subject to a host of possible errors, including errors due to erroneous or missing data, reporting 
errors, and errors in evaluating available performance data. In this section we relax the 
assumption of perfectly accurate monitoring to examine how inaccurate monitoring might affect 
the structure of self-enforcing IEAs.
6 Two types of monitoring errors are possible: given an 
audit, a compliant country may be judged to be noncompliant (a Type I error) and a 
noncompliant country may be judged to be compliant (a Type II error). Let   and 
denote the probabilities that the third-party enforcer commits a Type I error and Type 
II error, respectively. These probabilities are common knowledge among the countries and the 
enforcer.  
1 (0,1) ρ ∈
2 (0,1) ρ ∈
Maintaining the assumption that countries are risk neutral and simply imposing the result 
that parties to an agreement will instruct the third-party enforcer to impose the maximal fine in 
cases on noncompliance, it is straightforward to show that the expected welfare of a compliant 
country when monitoring is not perfectly accurate is  
  
1 ()
p ws x f πρ −− .         [ 1 3 ]  
Note that 
1 πρ  is the probability that a compliant firm is audited and judged to be noncompliant, 
and 
1f πρ is the country’s expected sanction from the possibility of a false judgment of 
                                                 
6 See Kaplow and Shavell (1994) for the effects of monitoring inaccuracy in a standard model of optimal law 
enforcement.  
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noncompliance.
7 Similarly, the expected welfare of a noncompliant country can be shown to be  
  
2 (1 ) ( 1 )
p ws x f πρ −−− − .        [ 1 4 ]  
In [14], 
2 (1 ) π ρ − in [14] is the probability that a noncompliant country is correctly determined to 
be noncompliant, and
2 (1 ) f πρ − is the expected penalty it faces.           
  Again, a country that is party to an IEA consisting of s members will comply with the 
terms of the agreement if and only if it expected payoff from compliance is not less that its 
expected payoff from noncompliance. Using [2] to substitute for   and   in [13] 
and [14], respectively, a country is compliant if and only if 
( )
p ws ( 1)
p ws −
12 (1 ) f cb πρ ρ − −≥ − . Clearly, 
given a monitoring intensity and the maximal available fine, the presence of monitoring errors of 
both types weakens deterrence. In fact, if 
12 1 ρρ + ≥ , then countries will never comply with the 
terms of an IEA, indicating that IEAs cannot form when monitoring errors are severe enough.  
From here on let us assume that   to allow an IEA to form.   
12 1 ρρ +<
  Because monitoring inaccuracy weakens deterrence, the payment by each member of an 
IEA to the enforcer will be higher. To see this, recall that the enforcer’s monitoring probability is 
determined by  x π α = . The minimum payment required of each member of an IEA is then the 
solution to 
12 (1 ) x fc αρ ρ −− = − b ; that is, 









.                 [15] 
                                                 
7 One may wonder why a compliant country that is incorrectly determined to be noncompliant (Type I error) will 
simply accept the penalty imposed on it.  At the very least, a compliant country that faces a sanction for 
noncompliance will attempt to prove that it has, in fact, satisfied the terms of the agreement. Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, for example, if the enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee finds a party to be in violation, that 
party is entitled to a hearing in which it can present additional evidence and expert testimony.  Further, if a party is 
still deemed noncompliant after the appeal process, it is given the chance to submit a final written testimony to the 
enforcement branch (UNFCC 2002). This process appears to be designed to limit the probability of a Type I error. 
Even if this probability is zero ( ), the results of this section hold as long as the probability of a Type II error is 
positive ( ), at least qualitatively. 
1 0 ρ =
2 0 ρ >
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Clearly, inaccurate monitoring increases the payment required of each party to an IEA to 
maintain compliance with the agreement.  
  Since inaccuracy is associated with increased enforcement costs, the circumstances under 
which cooperative agreements can increase international welfare, and hence, are expected to 
form, are limited by monitoring inaccuracy.  Recall from [7] that aggregate welfare can be 
expressed as , which reveals that cooperation increases aggregate welfare as 
long as .  Substituting [15] for x and solving
( ) NA s Nb c x +− −
0 Nb c x −−> 0 Nb c x − −> for N yields 









.        [ 1 6 ]  
Since the right hand side of [16] is increasing in 
1 ρ  and 
2 ρ , the range of international 
environmental problems that can be addressed with cooperative management is decreasing in 
these probabilities.  
  Provided that [16] holds, a self-enforcing agreement with a positive number of 
participating countries will form. Once again, the self-enforcing equilibrium is the minimum size 
coalition for which the welfare of each of the participating countries is not less than their welfare 
when no coalition forms; that is,  .  Substituting [15] for x yields    min | ( ) (0)
cp ss w s x w =− ≥
n p








      [ 1 7 ]  
Since the last term of [17] is increasing in
1 ρ  and 
2 ρ , monitoring inaccuracy will tend to produce 
higher levels of participation in IEAs that form. The intuition behind this result parallels the 
explanation of Proposition 3 in the previous section.  Monitoring errors increase the cost of 
multilateral cooperation. If an IEA is to form, therefore, greater participation is required so that 
the increase in international environmental quality offsets the additional enforcement costs.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
We have analyzed a game of self-enforcing international environmental agreements when parties 
to such an agreement finance an independent enforcement body to maintain compliance with the 
agreement. We have shown that costly enforcement limits the circumstances under which 
international cooperation to control a transboundary pollutant will increase aggregate welfare. 
Consequently, the circumstances under which an IEA can be expected to form are limited by 
costly enforcement. However, when an IEA is expected to form, participation with the agreement 
will typically be greater than when an IEA does not require costly enforcement. As a result, 
costly enforcement is associated with higher international environmental quality. In fact, under 
some circumstances, costly enforcement of an IEA is associated with higher aggregate welfare—
not for the parties to an IEA, however, but for the countries that choose to free-ride on the 
agreement.  We have also shown that these results are accentuated when monitoring for 
compliance to an agreement is subject to error. That is, monitoring inaccuracy further reduces the 
circumstances under which self-enforcing IEAs can form, but when they do form, participation 
will be higher.  
  Our results have important implications for multilateral management of environmental 
externalities.  By assuming away enforcement problems related to IEAs, the scope of mutually 
beneficial agreements between countries will be artificially enlarged and the minimum required 
coalition of countries will be artificially reduced.  In other words, for some international 
environmental problems, once enforcement costs are included, IEAs will either require more 
members before coming into effect or may not be worthwhile at all.   
While costly enforcement of IEAs is expected to result in improved environmental 
quality, the increased participation requirement may pose an additional problem for multilateral 
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cooperation.  The formation of an IEA is largely a problem of coordination among the countries 
involved.  Although the simple model proposed in this paper assumes countries can perfectly 
coordinate their actions, in reality coordination problems typically increase when more countries 
need to be involved.  Therefore, the increased membership requirement resulting from the 
enforcement problem may exacerbate the fundamental coordination, which, in turn, could 
jeopardize the formation of welfare-enhancing IEA.   
  Additionally, when IEAs require costly enforcement, the benefits to nonparticipation 
free-riding are higher.  Nonmembers escape both the cost of providing the public good and the 
additional cost of financing enforcement of cooperation, while benefiting from higher 
environmental quality.  If countries involved in forming an IEA have a strong aversion to 
inequity, the large benefits captured by the free-riders may prevent the agreement from 
materializing.  Greater welfare inequity may motivate countries to sacrifice individual and 
collective gains to prevent a self-enforcing agreement from forming in order to deny the gains to 
free-riders. 
  A logical next step in analyzing how costly enforcement and free-rider incentives affect 
the stability of international environmental agreements is to observe how people actually play 
these games.  It is well known that insights derived from theory are limited in that they abstract 
from a number of other potential influences on behavior.  The coordination and inequity 
problems previously described are just two examples.  Shogren (2006) argues for using 
economics experiments to analyze strategic interactions among players involved in forming self-
enforcing agreements.  Conducting controlled experiments may provide useful empirical 
evidence about the performance of these agreements. 
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  Finally, although the model developed in this paper offers new and interesting insights by 
introducing costly enforcement into the standard IEA game, it could easily be extended to 
include additional features.  The welfare functions of the parties, for example, could be 
constructed to better reflect the real heterogeneity of countries involved in a particular 
environmental problem.  Additionally, the analysis could investigate the effects of allowing for 
the possibility of multiple self-enforcing agreements forming concurrently.  Obviously, there are 
a host of other extensions that can and should be addressed to gain a more complete picture of 
how costly enforcement affects voluntary coalition formation to protect the international 
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